Introduction
Among the most controversial of David Ricardo's contributions to policy debate was his scheme for the redemption of the public debt by means of a 'capital levy'; a one-time tax on the property of the nation. Public debt policy had been the subject of sporadic debate throughout the eighteenth century, but faced increased scrutiny by the time Ricardo came to address the subject. While government rev-enues were suffering from the repeal of the temporary income tax which had been imposed during the Napoleonic Wars, revenue requirements remained high, as the savings in terms of military expenditures were being offset by the need to make interest payments on a debt which had grown during the latter years of the war. Ricardo's analysis of public debt was not novel; nor was the proposal for a capital levy to achieve its redemption.
1 Where Ricardo's proposal differed from its predecessors was in its provision that the burden of debt redemption was to be shared between owners of capital, owners of land, and holders of government bonds themselves.
Anderson and Tollison (1986) have presented a provocative explanation for Ricardo's advocacy of a capital levy. Their argument turns on the circumstance that in 1819, Ricardo retired from the government loan business, in which he had earned a fortune, and added to his already sizeable investments in land. They are troubled by the fact that Ricardo, recently 'acting as a major creditor for the debtprone government . . . , then enter[ed] Parliament to advocate radical anti-debt measures' (p. 52). They thus compare the timing of his entry into parliament with his changing pattern of investments, and ask, 'was Ricardo's seemingly odd behavioural shift in relation to the public debt consistent with simple wealth maximization on his part?' (ibid, p. 53). They argue that since a significant proportion of the burden of debt service fell on land, eradication of the public debt and with it a large number of taxes would have significantly raised the present discounted value of land. In the presence of efficient capital markets, an increase in taxation to redeem debt would be equivalent to the existing debt situation from the perspective of taxpayers in general. Crucial to their argument are two details of Ricardo's proposal: first, that government bond holdings themselves were to be subject to the levy, and second, that redemption of bonds was to occur not at face value, but at current market value. They surmise that such provisions amount to a partial repudiation of the debt, and 'Under these circumstances, Ricardo might well have expected to be a net beneficiary of debt retirement by means of the increased capital value of his large land holdings' (ibid, p. 55). Thus they conclude that 'Ricardo may have taken into account his personal financial interests while formulating [his] debt reform plan' (ibid, p. 56).
